Shabbat Shuvah 5768

Sources:

Halacha
Yoma 82a – mishna and gemara there
Yoma 83a – brayita ‘Tanu rabbanan mi sheachazo bulmos’
Yerushalmi Yoma 8:5 – ‘vhazariz mishtabeyach’
Rif on Yoma and the Ran ‘ vgarsinan bgemara mi sheachazo bulmos ‘ and the Rosh there. Ba’al Ma’or ‘vha dtanu rabbanan.’ Gemara Menachot 47a re: choleh sheamduhu lshtei grugarot
Shayalot U’teshuvot HaRashba 689
Rambam Shabbat 2:1 and the Kesef Mishne there
Pesachim 77a ‘savruah d’kulei alma tumah dechuya’ and Rashi ‘ dechuya ‘ there
Tur Orach Chayim 328 re: choleh dtzarich lbasar
Shulchan Aruch 328:14, Magen Avraham 9, Taz 6
Shulchan Aruch 618: 7-9, Magen Avraham 10, Taz 10, and see Rabbi Akiva Eger there

Aggadata
Yoma 85b – the sources for pikuach nefesh being doche shabbat
Avot 3:14, Maharal in Derech Hachayim there, Moreh Nevuchim 1:1, Tiferent Yisrael there
Sanhedrin mishna 4:5
Baba Metzia 58b-59a – regarding ‘malbin pnei chaveiru brabim’
Yoma 85b – the mishna regarding sins against one’s fellow man

The Talmud in Tractate Yoma, _____, has the statement that pikuach nefesh – a threat to one’s life – pushes away or takes precedence over any law – except for three sins (Rav Granatstein referred to them as ‘defining’ sins): idol worship, prohibited relationships, and taking the life of another. This shiur will discuss pikuach nefesh as it relates to shabbat and yom kippur.

One can make a distinction between two types of pikuach nefesh: a chronic threat to one’s life versus an acute threat to one’s life. A chronic threat is one that any shul rabbi will have come across. Someone knows in advance of Yom Kippur that he/she must eat, as per the doctor, or else it’s a threat to one’s life. And this is easy to deal with in that there is a known chemical balance one must have and you can plan accordingly that the person will eat/drink what is necessary over the course of the day. What and however much the doctor says must be eaten what is eaten (we will discuss the issue of the shiurim – measurements – a bit later).
The second type of pikuach nefesh – that of an acute threat – is one where there is no planning. Someone appears faint on Yom Kippur, for example. In this scenario you act immediately to relieve the issue, with whatever it takes. The mishna in Yoma discusses a pregnant woman who is feeling ill on Yom Kippur and asks specifically for non-kosher meat, and it says you give it to her. The Talmud elaborates steps you take to introduce it to her, first allowing her to taste it and then, if she is not better, to eat it, etc. But you do give it to her. A later brayita there follows with a case of someone suffering from Bulmos which again you treat as a life-threatening ailment. [Rambam translates bulmos as an epileptic attack and in practice, we treat someone suffering an epileptic seizure as a pikuach nefesh].

Raavad was asked the following question: someone is sick on shabbat and asks for some chicken. You have an option of a non-Jew killing a chicken and giving this meat to the sick person or a Jewish person can schecht a chicken and this can be given. On the one hand, you have the sick person eating non-kosher, but the person is a pikuach nefesh so it should be allowed. And the other option would allow him/her to eat kosher but you would have a Jewish person performing a violation of the Sabbath (schechting). Raavad says you have a Jewish person schecht the chicken. His logic is that the rule that pikuach nefesh will push away prohibitions applies specifically to those actions which, when forbidden, prevent the sick person from being treated. In this example, the action which is prohibited is the killing of the animal on Shabbat and this is the action that is now allowed. Eating non-kosher food is not the issue at hand (as there is kosher food available) and this action would not be allowed under these circumstances.

The Ran addresses the same question of the Raavad and arrives at the same conclusion, but his reasoning is different. The Ran says that when it comes to pikuach nefesh pushing away prohibitions, one must take a quantitative approach to the number of prohibitions being broken with each avenue of responding to situation. In this example, once a Jewish person has schechted the animal, there are no further violations of the law. However, if non-kosher food is given to the sick person, every k’zayit or morsel of food that is eaten is another breaking of the transgression of not eating kosher. Granted, pikuach nefesh allows prohibited actions but one must still take into account the prohibited actions and determine the way to do the fewest.
The Ba’al Ma’or cites a case which can serve as a proof text to the Ran’s opinion […]

The Ran’s opinion lends itself to a more general discussion that happens in this context, and that is – when we say that pikuach nefesh will push away other halachic institutions, is such an institution now ‘dechuya’ or ‘hutra.’ Dechuya means that the institution is still at play and you are allowed to violate that institution to save human life. Hutra means that in effect – the institution is no longer in play, at least with anything germane to the issue at hand of saving the person’s life. In either approach, one can do whatever is necessary to save a life. However, once there is a choice of options how to proceed, when the institution at hand is dechuya, you have to weigh which of your options is the least offensive to the institution. The Ran, by stating that we have to start weighing which avenue will have the fewest violations of Shabbat law, is taking a dechuya approach to the situation. [For the Ran, even if there is prepared non-kosher meat, he still says it’s preferable to have Jewish person schecht the animal rather than having the multiple violations of eating non-kosher food.]

The Rosh, discussing the same issues as the Ran, believes the institution is hutra. The Maharam M’Rotenberg gives three answers to the question of the Ran: 1) someone who was brought up eating kosher would not be able to stomach eating non-kosher meat so practically speaking, you would have to schecht the animal. (Rav Granatstein described this answer as a ‘ba’al batesh’ one in that it doesn’t address the fundamental issues at hand but takes a practical look at it). 2) [ . . . ] This second answer is taking the approach that the prohibition is hutra and anything can be done. 3) “it’s impossible that there is no child at the end of the earth.” This answer is unclear. Rav Granatstein reads it as following the second answer and saying: there’s always a sick child or someone in labor, somewhere, and if our law didn’t allow for these situations to be addressed on shabbat or yom kippur, it would be too difficult for us to live by.

The Sha’alot U’teshuvot of the Rashba refers to the first answer of the Maharam and then gives his own opinion. He gets to the core of our discussion and says the question hinges on whether or not it is dechuya or hutra. And the Rashba believes the halacha is that shabbos is dechuya only. [The Rashba brings into the discussion the related topic of whether tum’ah is hutra or dechuya for communal issues. In the course of the service in the Temple, an impure person or animal could bring impurity to utensils or parts of the animal used in the service. The Rashba’s example, quoting from the gemara, is where there are two bowls of blood – one of which we know to be impure – and the service at hand is related to a communal sacrifice. Can you use the bowl of blood that you know to be impure or not? To do so would mean you believe that the prohibitions related to impurity in the Temple and service are hutra in the context of communal sacrifice. In this context, Rav Granatstein cited a Rashi in Pesachim 79a, Rashi ‘Tum’ah dechuya hi b’tzibur’ which he described as an interesting formulation: it is with difficulty that it was allowed and whenever it is possible to find a pure item or to deal with impurity of a lower severity, we try to do so. The list of sources for the shiur refers to Rashi on 77a which defines ‘dechuya’ in the usual sense, but this was not cited in the shiur itself].

Rambam states clearly that shabbat is ‘Dechuya.’ The Kesef Mishna on the Rambam cites the Rashi, the Rashba, and the Ran and connects the issues of dechuya/hutra by a danger to life and dechuya/hutra by impurity.

Tur seems to paskan hutra and all is allowed, which would make sense in his siding with the Rosh noted above. The Bet Yosef gives two reasons for the Tur’s psak. One – like the Maharam. Two – like the Ran. Meaning the Bet Yosef believes that one can understand the Tur that shabbat is dechuya or is hutra.

Returning to the chronic sickness we noted above where one can plan for it, the Shulchan Aruch brings the halacha that one eats less than 2/3 of an egg (the estimated size of a ‘grugarat’) and waits the time it would take to eat 4 eggs worth of food. The Chatam Sofer gave this a time of 9 minutes. The background for this is that while it is prohibited to eat even a small amount of food on Yom Kippur (as it is prohibited to eat small amount of any prohibited substance), there is a minimum amount which is required to obligate someone in the penalty of karet and even when the eating is allowed because one is ill, we try to avoid having someone eat this amount of food. The 9 minute waiting period allows us to view the small amounts eaten each time as two separate episodes of eating rather than one continuous one. Similarly, when it comes to drinking, one measures out one cheek full of liquid before Yom Kippur and can drink a little less than this amount every 9 minutes.

However, the Shulchan Aruch is explicit that if we think these measurements won’t be enough for the sick person, or if the sick person says they won’t be enough or if we have any doubt about the matter at all – we feed the sick person whatever food and drink is necessary. [i.e. the whole issue of measured amounts only applies when it’s a planned response to a condition noted before Yom Kippur but not when there is any doubt about the adequacy of the approach].
One halachic point to add to the discussion: the Shulchan Aruch paskans that if someone has to eat on Yom Kippur, he/she has to bentch and add Ya’aleh v’yavoh in the bentching. The Taz questions this saying that it’s not possible we would refer to Yom Kippur after eating on it. Rav Akiva Eger actually takes it a step further than on a Yom Kippur which falls on shabbat, not only would you bentch, you would have to say kiddush before eating anything, just like you would any other shabbat.

Aggadata
The Gemara quotes different sources to substantiate that pikuach nefesh comes before keeping the usual prohibitions of shabbat. One source is the logic that you violate this shabbat to allow the keeping of future shabbatot, meaning that shabbat is there for us to keep and if keeping it now will prevent us from keeping it in the future, that is not what is meant to happen. A second source quoted it the verse “ v’chai bahem “ – that we are to live by God’s laws and not die by them.

The mishna in Avot says that Man is beloved because he is created “b’tzelem.” What does “b’tzelem” mean? Rambam in the first chapter of his Moreh Nevuchim says it refers to man’s intellect. Rashi explains similarly that man’s uniqueness lies in his intellect and power of speech. The Rambam’s explanation of tzelem leaves open the question – is this a reason that man is greater than the animals or is there more – that man is greater than even the angels b/c even man’s physical side is part of the tzelem referred to? (and the Rambam himself raises this question in his Moreh). The Maharal answers that even the physical is part of the greatness of man, and the Maharal gives two examples of this – though we could develop more. One is that while the ape walks hunched over, man walks upright. Man’s posture reflects his rule over the world and shows the majesty of God over creation. A second – a human’s face gives off a light that other creatures don’t. And this could be the explanation of the comment in Baba Metzia (58b-59a) that one who causes his friend’s face to whiten (embarrasses him), it is as if he has killed him – by causing the color to drain from one’s face in the act of embarrassment, one has removed the Godly quality of the person in that sense.

The mishna in Sanhedrin addresses the question – why was man created alone in the world (the mishna’s context is one of putting the fear of lying in witnesses – see the mishna for further context)? It says to show that anyone who destroys or causes to be lost a single human being it is as if an entire world has been destroyed. Meaning, each person is created with the tzelem of God and each person is a unique embodiment of this tzelem. So each person has value unique to him/her that another person would not have.

We have to view our relationships with our fellow man in this way. Each person has a value unique to him/her and we have to do all that we can to appreciate this person and certainly nothing to take away from that person.