Parashat V’etchanan has a recurring emphasis on ‘loving God,’ the most well-known example being the verse of loving God with all your heart, your soul, and your ‘meod’ (taken as money – for one who loves his money more than his life).
Our Sages have dealt with the question,”how can one love God if we cannot know what He is?” The Rambam put forth an answer to this question that has become accepted through much of Jewish thought. The Rambam describes how while we cannot know what God is, we can understand the world He has set up. The rules of science reflect how God chooses to order the world and in effect – how God ‘thinks.’ This knowledge and the knowledge of God’s Torah are the closest we can come to knowing or understanding God. From this understanding – we can have a love of God.
Rabbi Granatstein raised the question that this type of path to loving God isn’t available to the masses. You need someone who can master the sciences and the Torah, before that person can truly love God. The question remains then, how can someone who is not going to master the sciences and the Torah fulfill his /her obligation to love God?
Here, Rabbi Granatstein turned to some concepts in the kabbalah. The kabbalah refers to the ‘ayn sof’ as the unknowable aspect of God. The next level down is ‘yesh.’ Yesh m’ayin – the concept used to describe the original creation – refers to God’s putting forth the aspect of Him that is knowable. In the kabbalistic terms, then, our knowledge of God is tied to His creation and His works on earth.
What we can do is see the work of God here on earth. We can appreciate what He does and through this sensitivity, we can come to love God. [Clarification from after the talk: This doesn’t rely on God doing ‘good’ things or trying to address concepts of bad things happening to good people. Rather, this is developing a sensitivity to how everything in the world comes from God and depends on Him.]
Wednesday, September 2, 2009
Shabbat Parshat Matot-Masei, 5769
Summary: Rav Granatstein spoke on the ability to be ‘matir neder’ – to undo a vow that has been taken – and why we have this allowance in the law.
Parashat Matot opens with the laws of one who takes an oath or a vow. We can get a context for these laws by looking at the end of last week’s parasha, Parashat Pinchas. In Parashat Pinchas, the parasha reviews the different sacrifices that are brought on the holidays. That parasha ends “These are what you will make/offer to Hashem on your holidays, aside from your [personal gifts that are brought to the beit hamikdash]. And Moshe spoke to the Jewish people all that Hashem had commanded him.” On the face of it, this gives us the lead in to our parasha. Last week – we discussed the holiday sacrifices and in that context made reference to the personal sacrifices offered by man; now we move to the laws of the personal sacrifices – those promised by man rather than those governed by the calendar. [Rashi on last week’s parasha explains the reference to the personal sacrifices as a suggestion to us that when we come to the Mikdash on the holidays, it’s a good time to bring any sacrifices that we had promised during the year.]
The last verse, “And Moshe . . . “ doesn’t quite fit, in light of this, in that this separates the flow from the discussion in last week’s parasha to this week’s. Rashi and the Ramban address this. In the Ramban’s explanation, he suggests that this verse may be emphasizing the difference between the personal neder and the sacrifices of the holidays; the personal neder is subject to a single expert or three regular people/judges who can allow/undo the neder while the holiday sacrifices depend on calendar, with three expert judges sanctifying the new moon.
The concept of being ‘matir neder’ requires explanation. Why should we have this allowance? The Gemara emphasizes the importance of meaning what you say – yes or no should mean yes or no. Here – we are allowing you to go against what you said, and even though you backed it up with a neder. Moreover, the verse says ‘do not nullify/break what you said, like all that you said – do;’ allowing you to get out of the neder doesn’t seem to fit with this emphasis. [And we know historically, this concept caused us trouble with the sectarians who did not accept the oral law. Our allowing this gave them a claim against us that we weren’t adhering to the Torah. We don’t need to answer their claims but we can assume that they were intelligent people and their question is not a stupid one.] To better understand this allowance, we will look at how neder works; the way to do this, is to compare and contrast a neder with a shavuah, or oath.
An oath is on an action. For example, an oath that I will / will not eat fruit. A neder is on a specific object or set of objects. For example, a neder that all fruits in the world are prohibited to me. In the Brisker learning, this is the difference between an ‘isur gavra’ – a prohibition on the person – and an isur cheftza – a prohibition on an object. In the Halacha, we have an important difference between these two methods of creating prohibitions/obligations on yourself. With regard to a shavuah (“oath”), if you take an oath that goes against the Torah, we say you are already sworn to do the mitzvot from when we were at Sinai and the new oath cannot apply to overturn the one that is currently in place. However, if you took an oath for example that “all sukkot in the world should be prohibited from me,” that would apply and de facto, you would not be able to fulfill the mitzvah of eating in the sukkah. The reasoning is that the focus is on the object and your not obligation vis a vis the object. Even though the neder is causing you to not be able to do a mitzvah, since the neder is not directed against the mitzvah directly, the vow stands.
Coming back to our parshiot, the holiday sacrifices depend on the calendar. And – while the courts have the authority to make the calendar and set the dates – they do have rules they have to follow: the holidays must be on separate days, the new month itself must begin on one of two days, etc. In short, there is an order that must be followed. By contrast, we have the personal vows and oaths which are open for anyone to take oneself. And when it comes to a vow, this can be done even to a point where a mitzvah is no longer doable.
We first see the power of speech being emphasized in the story of the creation of Adam. It says that Hashem blew into man’s nostrils. Onkelos comments there that a ‘ruach mellalela’ filled man. Rashi quotes this and explains that this refers to man’s power of speech. Speech allows man to voice his thoughts and give expression to them. And the first command given to man is to name the animals – using his power of speech to categorize. Speech is presented as a power that elevates man over the animals.
In our parashah, the phrase ‘zeh hadavar’ (this is the thing) appears in the laws of vows and oaths. This same language appears in Parashat Acharei Mot (Vayikra, 17:2) in the prohibition of offering a sacrifice outside of the Mikdash. The Gemara makes a gzeira shava (learns rules from one to the other, because of the language similarity, not because of the discussions being similar) and learns that just as there is the opportunity to go to a wise man and allow a vow, as if it had not been taken, so too with regard to offering sacrifices outside the Mikdash – if one has done so, one can approach a wise man who can allow the designation of the animal as holy / Hekdesh and retroactively, make it that nothing wrong was done with the offering outside the Mikdash.
The Rambam at the end of the laws of nedarim, cites our Sages that one who takes a neder it’s as if he has built a bamah – a personal altar. The Rambam is quoting a Gemara in Nedarim, 22a. There Rav Natan says that one who takes a neder, it’s as if he has built a bamah and one who then is mekayem (upholds) the neder, it’s as if he has offered a sacrifice on that bamah (which is prohibited with a punishment of karet).
What is the meaning of this? The Ran there cites the Yerushalmi. The Yerushalmi explains that just like the Torah warned us to bring certain sacrifices inside the Mikdash and not to add to these sacrifices, so too the Torah has given us certain prohibitions and we are not to add on to these prohibitions. Why? The personal altar reflects a breakdown in the community. Each person worshipping in his own way and time. In broader terms, people could accept all sorts of laws / prohibitions on themselves and in doing so – dilute the effect and power of those mandated in the Torah. The message of the Torah can get diluted as we add these prohibitions. Here – quantity takes away from the quality or unique aspect of what we were given.
The laws of neder and oath are in place to allow their good use. For example, someone who is a recovering alcoholic who has managed through recovery and is now on the mend – this person may benefit from an additional prohibition accepted on himself, to shore up the fight he now has. But people can start accepting things that are actually harmful to their spiritual well being. Man has the power of speech but man makes mistakes. Citing the Baron Acton,”Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. . . “ The laws of matir neder are a practical necessity and a reminder to us that we must be careful in our vows as man does make mistakes.
Parashat Matot opens with the laws of one who takes an oath or a vow. We can get a context for these laws by looking at the end of last week’s parasha, Parashat Pinchas. In Parashat Pinchas, the parasha reviews the different sacrifices that are brought on the holidays. That parasha ends “These are what you will make/offer to Hashem on your holidays, aside from your [personal gifts that are brought to the beit hamikdash]. And Moshe spoke to the Jewish people all that Hashem had commanded him.” On the face of it, this gives us the lead in to our parasha. Last week – we discussed the holiday sacrifices and in that context made reference to the personal sacrifices offered by man; now we move to the laws of the personal sacrifices – those promised by man rather than those governed by the calendar. [Rashi on last week’s parasha explains the reference to the personal sacrifices as a suggestion to us that when we come to the Mikdash on the holidays, it’s a good time to bring any sacrifices that we had promised during the year.]
The last verse, “And Moshe . . . “ doesn’t quite fit, in light of this, in that this separates the flow from the discussion in last week’s parasha to this week’s. Rashi and the Ramban address this. In the Ramban’s explanation, he suggests that this verse may be emphasizing the difference between the personal neder and the sacrifices of the holidays; the personal neder is subject to a single expert or three regular people/judges who can allow/undo the neder while the holiday sacrifices depend on calendar, with three expert judges sanctifying the new moon.
The concept of being ‘matir neder’ requires explanation. Why should we have this allowance? The Gemara emphasizes the importance of meaning what you say – yes or no should mean yes or no. Here – we are allowing you to go against what you said, and even though you backed it up with a neder. Moreover, the verse says ‘do not nullify/break what you said, like all that you said – do;’ allowing you to get out of the neder doesn’t seem to fit with this emphasis. [And we know historically, this concept caused us trouble with the sectarians who did not accept the oral law. Our allowing this gave them a claim against us that we weren’t adhering to the Torah. We don’t need to answer their claims but we can assume that they were intelligent people and their question is not a stupid one.] To better understand this allowance, we will look at how neder works; the way to do this, is to compare and contrast a neder with a shavuah, or oath.
An oath is on an action. For example, an oath that I will / will not eat fruit. A neder is on a specific object or set of objects. For example, a neder that all fruits in the world are prohibited to me. In the Brisker learning, this is the difference between an ‘isur gavra’ – a prohibition on the person – and an isur cheftza – a prohibition on an object. In the Halacha, we have an important difference between these two methods of creating prohibitions/obligations on yourself. With regard to a shavuah (“oath”), if you take an oath that goes against the Torah, we say you are already sworn to do the mitzvot from when we were at Sinai and the new oath cannot apply to overturn the one that is currently in place. However, if you took an oath for example that “all sukkot in the world should be prohibited from me,” that would apply and de facto, you would not be able to fulfill the mitzvah of eating in the sukkah. The reasoning is that the focus is on the object and your not obligation vis a vis the object. Even though the neder is causing you to not be able to do a mitzvah, since the neder is not directed against the mitzvah directly, the vow stands.
Coming back to our parshiot, the holiday sacrifices depend on the calendar. And – while the courts have the authority to make the calendar and set the dates – they do have rules they have to follow: the holidays must be on separate days, the new month itself must begin on one of two days, etc. In short, there is an order that must be followed. By contrast, we have the personal vows and oaths which are open for anyone to take oneself. And when it comes to a vow, this can be done even to a point where a mitzvah is no longer doable.
We first see the power of speech being emphasized in the story of the creation of Adam. It says that Hashem blew into man’s nostrils. Onkelos comments there that a ‘ruach mellalela’ filled man. Rashi quotes this and explains that this refers to man’s power of speech. Speech allows man to voice his thoughts and give expression to them. And the first command given to man is to name the animals – using his power of speech to categorize. Speech is presented as a power that elevates man over the animals.
In our parashah, the phrase ‘zeh hadavar’ (this is the thing) appears in the laws of vows and oaths. This same language appears in Parashat Acharei Mot (Vayikra, 17:2) in the prohibition of offering a sacrifice outside of the Mikdash. The Gemara makes a gzeira shava (learns rules from one to the other, because of the language similarity, not because of the discussions being similar) and learns that just as there is the opportunity to go to a wise man and allow a vow, as if it had not been taken, so too with regard to offering sacrifices outside the Mikdash – if one has done so, one can approach a wise man who can allow the designation of the animal as holy / Hekdesh and retroactively, make it that nothing wrong was done with the offering outside the Mikdash.
The Rambam at the end of the laws of nedarim, cites our Sages that one who takes a neder it’s as if he has built a bamah – a personal altar. The Rambam is quoting a Gemara in Nedarim, 22a. There Rav Natan says that one who takes a neder, it’s as if he has built a bamah and one who then is mekayem (upholds) the neder, it’s as if he has offered a sacrifice on that bamah (which is prohibited with a punishment of karet).
What is the meaning of this? The Ran there cites the Yerushalmi. The Yerushalmi explains that just like the Torah warned us to bring certain sacrifices inside the Mikdash and not to add to these sacrifices, so too the Torah has given us certain prohibitions and we are not to add on to these prohibitions. Why? The personal altar reflects a breakdown in the community. Each person worshipping in his own way and time. In broader terms, people could accept all sorts of laws / prohibitions on themselves and in doing so – dilute the effect and power of those mandated in the Torah. The message of the Torah can get diluted as we add these prohibitions. Here – quantity takes away from the quality or unique aspect of what we were given.
The laws of neder and oath are in place to allow their good use. For example, someone who is a recovering alcoholic who has managed through recovery and is now on the mend – this person may benefit from an additional prohibition accepted on himself, to shore up the fight he now has. But people can start accepting things that are actually harmful to their spiritual well being. Man has the power of speech but man makes mistakes. Citing the Baron Acton,”Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. . . “ The laws of matir neder are a practical necessity and a reminder to us that we must be careful in our vows as man does make mistakes.
Sunday, July 12, 2009
Shabbat Parshat Pinchas, 5769
Rav Granatstein Parashat Pinchas 7/09 (5769)
The sin that led up to the story of Pinchas had two components to it. One – the worship of ba’al peor and two – orgiastic rites associated with it. [The Gemara adds that it also involved defecation – adding another layer of degradation to the act.] God's response to Moshe is frightening, effectively telling him to gather up the leaders of the people and to hang them – a pre-emptive act. Moshe – the great lawgiver – transmits this order to the people by gathering the judges, directing them to attempt to discern between the good and the bad; the tone of God’s Command is one of pre-emptive/non-discerning while the details of Moshe’s command are not so.
At the same time as this is going on, a plague hits the camp. A plague, by its nature, is pre-emptive. Once unleashed – it does not discern between good and bad. [See Rashi commenting on the need for protection during the plague of the first born in Egypt.]
The camp is in a state of mourning over their state and sin. They regret their act; the Torah says the people were crying. They see the plague killing and Moshe’s responding with the judges. And in this context, Zimri does his brazen act. Pinchas enters the Kubah and pierces Zimri and the woman ‘kubatah.’
[‘Kubah’ has a connotation of a place of rite/ritual – in this case, the place where the pagan worship was being done. There are two readings on the word ‘kubatah,’ whether it means again, in the Kubah / tent of worship or if it means ‘her means of worship’ meaning the sexual organs used by the woman for her worship. Onkelos, cited by Rashi and like the Medrash, learns it means her sexual organs. Shadal { the greatest master of ta’amim since the Minchat Shai } brings a proof to this reading from the trup in the pasuk.
Ibn Ezra believes the simple meaning is that it is the tent. Rav Granatstein likes the Rashi / Onkelos interpretation better. In this case, the verse with its ta’amim is fitting / teaching a halachic principle about kanaut (zealotry). The halacha is that one can act out of zealotry only while the act is going on. Had Zimri done his action and finished it and then Pinchas had killed him, Pinchas would have been punishable by death. Onkelos’s reading emphasizes that only because they were in the middle of the act was Pinchas allowed to do this.]
After Pinchas kills them, the plague ends and presumably so does the judging being done by Moshe and the judges. There is peace once again in the camp.
Our parasha, Parashat Pinchas, opens with God giving Pinchas his Brit Shalom and then his Brit Kehunat Olam. The Brit Shalom follows the peace brought by Pinchas to the camp.
Regarding the Brit Kehunat Olam, there are differing opinions between the Talmud Bavli and the Talmud Yerushalmi. Why wasn’t Pinchas a kohen already; he was a grandson of Aharon? The Bavli, cited by Rashi, explains that the priesthood was given only to Aharon and his sons. Pinchas, who had already been born, was not to be a kohen; now, under these special circumstances, he was given the priesthood as well. The Yerushalmi, on a completely different matter, clearly argues with this. When Aharon’s sons, Nadav and Avihu, die, there is a famous dialogue between Moshe and Aharon when Aharon does not eat from a sacrifice that is brought. The Yerushalmi asks,”why couldn’t Pinchas have eaten from it?” This event pre-dates that of Zimri and has the Yerushalmi taking the stand that Pinchas was already a Cohen.
According to the Yerushalmi, why does God need to give Pinchas the Kehunat Olam – again? The Zohar elaborates on this, explaining that the Halacha prohibits a kohen who has killed – even by accident – from serving in the Sanctuary. He is considered a chalal and cannot serve. Here, God is affirming the fact that Pinchas could and should still serve.
We can ask the question ‘Why?’ What was it about Pinchas’s act of murder that still allowed him to serve? Rav Granatstein cited a modern day question: kohanim in the Israeli army who served on the battlefield and killed people, as they were supposed to, who then return home – can they still duchan in shul? The answer given many Poskim is yes and the reason is these Kohanim soldiers are considered to be ‘Oness’ – where it was beyond their control. They had no choice but to do what was necessary during their tour of duty.
Rav Granatstein applied the same concept to Pinchas. He had no alternative; while Zimri’s act was going on, he had an inner compulsion to act in response. God is affirming that Pinchas was indeed in the category of Oness. Rav Granatstein further noted that the impact of Pinchas’s act of murder was one fitting for a kohen – it was Mechaper for the people and stopped the punishment. [After the drasha, Rav Granatstein added that in the next parasha, we will see that murderers in arei miklat – cities of refuge – are tied there until the death of the high priest. The association is one where the high priest’s role is to extend life and not shorten it; here, Pinchas has this impact of saving lives by his action.]
And we see that after we enter the land, Pinchas’s lineage becomes the lineage – beginning with Tzadok – for all high priests. This is in Pinchas’ merit, through his action – albeit a violent one - resulted in kaparah and the saving of lives.
The sin that led up to the story of Pinchas had two components to it. One – the worship of ba’al peor and two – orgiastic rites associated with it. [The Gemara adds that it also involved defecation – adding another layer of degradation to the act.] God's response to Moshe is frightening, effectively telling him to gather up the leaders of the people and to hang them – a pre-emptive act. Moshe – the great lawgiver – transmits this order to the people by gathering the judges, directing them to attempt to discern between the good and the bad; the tone of God’s Command is one of pre-emptive/non-discerning while the details of Moshe’s command are not so.
At the same time as this is going on, a plague hits the camp. A plague, by its nature, is pre-emptive. Once unleashed – it does not discern between good and bad. [See Rashi commenting on the need for protection during the plague of the first born in Egypt.]
The camp is in a state of mourning over their state and sin. They regret their act; the Torah says the people were crying. They see the plague killing and Moshe’s responding with the judges. And in this context, Zimri does his brazen act. Pinchas enters the Kubah and pierces Zimri and the woman ‘kubatah.’
[‘Kubah’ has a connotation of a place of rite/ritual – in this case, the place where the pagan worship was being done. There are two readings on the word ‘kubatah,’ whether it means again, in the Kubah / tent of worship or if it means ‘her means of worship’ meaning the sexual organs used by the woman for her worship. Onkelos, cited by Rashi and like the Medrash, learns it means her sexual organs. Shadal { the greatest master of ta’amim since the Minchat Shai } brings a proof to this reading from the trup in the pasuk.
Ibn Ezra believes the simple meaning is that it is the tent. Rav Granatstein likes the Rashi / Onkelos interpretation better. In this case, the verse with its ta’amim is fitting / teaching a halachic principle about kanaut (zealotry). The halacha is that one can act out of zealotry only while the act is going on. Had Zimri done his action and finished it and then Pinchas had killed him, Pinchas would have been punishable by death. Onkelos’s reading emphasizes that only because they were in the middle of the act was Pinchas allowed to do this.]
After Pinchas kills them, the plague ends and presumably so does the judging being done by Moshe and the judges. There is peace once again in the camp.
Our parasha, Parashat Pinchas, opens with God giving Pinchas his Brit Shalom and then his Brit Kehunat Olam. The Brit Shalom follows the peace brought by Pinchas to the camp.
Regarding the Brit Kehunat Olam, there are differing opinions between the Talmud Bavli and the Talmud Yerushalmi. Why wasn’t Pinchas a kohen already; he was a grandson of Aharon? The Bavli, cited by Rashi, explains that the priesthood was given only to Aharon and his sons. Pinchas, who had already been born, was not to be a kohen; now, under these special circumstances, he was given the priesthood as well. The Yerushalmi, on a completely different matter, clearly argues with this. When Aharon’s sons, Nadav and Avihu, die, there is a famous dialogue between Moshe and Aharon when Aharon does not eat from a sacrifice that is brought. The Yerushalmi asks,”why couldn’t Pinchas have eaten from it?” This event pre-dates that of Zimri and has the Yerushalmi taking the stand that Pinchas was already a Cohen.
According to the Yerushalmi, why does God need to give Pinchas the Kehunat Olam – again? The Zohar elaborates on this, explaining that the Halacha prohibits a kohen who has killed – even by accident – from serving in the Sanctuary. He is considered a chalal and cannot serve. Here, God is affirming the fact that Pinchas could and should still serve.
We can ask the question ‘Why?’ What was it about Pinchas’s act of murder that still allowed him to serve? Rav Granatstein cited a modern day question: kohanim in the Israeli army who served on the battlefield and killed people, as they were supposed to, who then return home – can they still duchan in shul? The answer given many Poskim is yes and the reason is these Kohanim soldiers are considered to be ‘Oness’ – where it was beyond their control. They had no choice but to do what was necessary during their tour of duty.
Rav Granatstein applied the same concept to Pinchas. He had no alternative; while Zimri’s act was going on, he had an inner compulsion to act in response. God is affirming that Pinchas was indeed in the category of Oness. Rav Granatstein further noted that the impact of Pinchas’s act of murder was one fitting for a kohen – it was Mechaper for the people and stopped the punishment. [After the drasha, Rav Granatstein added that in the next parasha, we will see that murderers in arei miklat – cities of refuge – are tied there until the death of the high priest. The association is one where the high priest’s role is to extend life and not shorten it; here, Pinchas has this impact of saving lives by his action.]
And we see that after we enter the land, Pinchas’s lineage becomes the lineage – beginning with Tzadok – for all high priests. This is in Pinchas’ merit, through his action – albeit a violent one - resulted in kaparah and the saving of lives.
Monday, September 17, 2007
Shabbat Shuvah 5768
Sources:
Halacha
Yoma 82a – mishna and gemara there
Yoma 83a – brayita ‘Tanu rabbanan mi sheachazo bulmos’
Yerushalmi Yoma 8:5 – ‘vhazariz mishtabeyach’
Rif on Yoma and the Ran ‘ vgarsinan bgemara mi sheachazo bulmos ‘ and the Rosh there. Ba’al Ma’or ‘vha dtanu rabbanan.’ Gemara Menachot 47a re: choleh sheamduhu lshtei grugarot
Shayalot U’teshuvot HaRashba 689
Rambam Shabbat 2:1 and the Kesef Mishne there
Pesachim 77a ‘savruah d’kulei alma tumah dechuya’ and Rashi ‘ dechuya ‘ there
Tur Orach Chayim 328 re: choleh dtzarich lbasar
Shulchan Aruch 328:14, Magen Avraham 9, Taz 6
Shulchan Aruch 618: 7-9, Magen Avraham 10, Taz 10, and see Rabbi Akiva Eger there
Aggadata
Yoma 85b – the sources for pikuach nefesh being doche shabbat
Avot 3:14, Maharal in Derech Hachayim there, Moreh Nevuchim 1:1, Tiferent Yisrael there
Sanhedrin mishna 4:5
Baba Metzia 58b-59a – regarding ‘malbin pnei chaveiru brabim’
Yoma 85b – the mishna regarding sins against one’s fellow man
The Talmud in Tractate Yoma, _____, has the statement that pikuach nefesh – a threat to one’s life – pushes away or takes precedence over any law – except for three sins (Rav Granatstein referred to them as ‘defining’ sins): idol worship, prohibited relationships, and taking the life of another. This shiur will discuss pikuach nefesh as it relates to shabbat and yom kippur.
One can make a distinction between two types of pikuach nefesh: a chronic threat to one’s life versus an acute threat to one’s life. A chronic threat is one that any shul rabbi will have come across. Someone knows in advance of Yom Kippur that he/she must eat, as per the doctor, or else it’s a threat to one’s life. And this is easy to deal with in that there is a known chemical balance one must have and you can plan accordingly that the person will eat/drink what is necessary over the course of the day. What and however much the doctor says must be eaten what is eaten (we will discuss the issue of the shiurim – measurements – a bit later).
The second type of pikuach nefesh – that of an acute threat – is one where there is no planning. Someone appears faint on Yom Kippur, for example. In this scenario you act immediately to relieve the issue, with whatever it takes. The mishna in Yoma discusses a pregnant woman who is feeling ill on Yom Kippur and asks specifically for non-kosher meat, and it says you give it to her. The Talmud elaborates steps you take to introduce it to her, first allowing her to taste it and then, if she is not better, to eat it, etc. But you do give it to her. A later brayita there follows with a case of someone suffering from Bulmos which again you treat as a life-threatening ailment. [Rambam translates bulmos as an epileptic attack and in practice, we treat someone suffering an epileptic seizure as a pikuach nefesh].
Raavad was asked the following question: someone is sick on shabbat and asks for some chicken. You have an option of a non-Jew killing a chicken and giving this meat to the sick person or a Jewish person can schecht a chicken and this can be given. On the one hand, you have the sick person eating non-kosher, but the person is a pikuach nefesh so it should be allowed. And the other option would allow him/her to eat kosher but you would have a Jewish person performing a violation of the Sabbath (schechting). Raavad says you have a Jewish person schecht the chicken. His logic is that the rule that pikuach nefesh will push away prohibitions applies specifically to those actions which, when forbidden, prevent the sick person from being treated. In this example, the action which is prohibited is the killing of the animal on Shabbat and this is the action that is now allowed. Eating non-kosher food is not the issue at hand (as there is kosher food available) and this action would not be allowed under these circumstances.
The Ran addresses the same question of the Raavad and arrives at the same conclusion, but his reasoning is different. The Ran says that when it comes to pikuach nefesh pushing away prohibitions, one must take a quantitative approach to the number of prohibitions being broken with each avenue of responding to situation. In this example, once a Jewish person has schechted the animal, there are no further violations of the law. However, if non-kosher food is given to the sick person, every k’zayit or morsel of food that is eaten is another breaking of the transgression of not eating kosher. Granted, pikuach nefesh allows prohibited actions but one must still take into account the prohibited actions and determine the way to do the fewest.
The Ba’al Ma’or cites a case which can serve as a proof text to the Ran’s opinion […]
The Ran’s opinion lends itself to a more general discussion that happens in this context, and that is – when we say that pikuach nefesh will push away other halachic institutions, is such an institution now ‘dechuya’ or ‘hutra.’ Dechuya means that the institution is still at play and you are allowed to violate that institution to save human life. Hutra means that in effect – the institution is no longer in play, at least with anything germane to the issue at hand of saving the person’s life. In either approach, one can do whatever is necessary to save a life. However, once there is a choice of options how to proceed, when the institution at hand is dechuya, you have to weigh which of your options is the least offensive to the institution. The Ran, by stating that we have to start weighing which avenue will have the fewest violations of Shabbat law, is taking a dechuya approach to the situation. [For the Ran, even if there is prepared non-kosher meat, he still says it’s preferable to have Jewish person schecht the animal rather than having the multiple violations of eating non-kosher food.]
The Rosh, discussing the same issues as the Ran, believes the institution is hutra. The Maharam M’Rotenberg gives three answers to the question of the Ran: 1) someone who was brought up eating kosher would not be able to stomach eating non-kosher meat so practically speaking, you would have to schecht the animal. (Rav Granatstein described this answer as a ‘ba’al batesh’ one in that it doesn’t address the fundamental issues at hand but takes a practical look at it). 2) [ . . . ] This second answer is taking the approach that the prohibition is hutra and anything can be done. 3) “it’s impossible that there is no child at the end of the earth.” This answer is unclear. Rav Granatstein reads it as following the second answer and saying: there’s always a sick child or someone in labor, somewhere, and if our law didn’t allow for these situations to be addressed on shabbat or yom kippur, it would be too difficult for us to live by.
The Sha’alot U’teshuvot of the Rashba refers to the first answer of the Maharam and then gives his own opinion. He gets to the core of our discussion and says the question hinges on whether or not it is dechuya or hutra. And the Rashba believes the halacha is that shabbos is dechuya only. [The Rashba brings into the discussion the related topic of whether tum’ah is hutra or dechuya for communal issues. In the course of the service in the Temple, an impure person or animal could bring impurity to utensils or parts of the animal used in the service. The Rashba’s example, quoting from the gemara, is where there are two bowls of blood – one of which we know to be impure – and the service at hand is related to a communal sacrifice. Can you use the bowl of blood that you know to be impure or not? To do so would mean you believe that the prohibitions related to impurity in the Temple and service are hutra in the context of communal sacrifice. In this context, Rav Granatstein cited a Rashi in Pesachim 79a, Rashi ‘Tum’ah dechuya hi b’tzibur’ which he described as an interesting formulation: it is with difficulty that it was allowed and whenever it is possible to find a pure item or to deal with impurity of a lower severity, we try to do so. The list of sources for the shiur refers to Rashi on 77a which defines ‘dechuya’ in the usual sense, but this was not cited in the shiur itself].
Rambam states clearly that shabbat is ‘Dechuya.’ The Kesef Mishna on the Rambam cites the Rashi, the Rashba, and the Ran and connects the issues of dechuya/hutra by a danger to life and dechuya/hutra by impurity.
Tur seems to paskan hutra and all is allowed, which would make sense in his siding with the Rosh noted above. The Bet Yosef gives two reasons for the Tur’s psak. One – like the Maharam. Two – like the Ran. Meaning the Bet Yosef believes that one can understand the Tur that shabbat is dechuya or is hutra.
Returning to the chronic sickness we noted above where one can plan for it, the Shulchan Aruch brings the halacha that one eats less than 2/3 of an egg (the estimated size of a ‘grugarat’) and waits the time it would take to eat 4 eggs worth of food. The Chatam Sofer gave this a time of 9 minutes. The background for this is that while it is prohibited to eat even a small amount of food on Yom Kippur (as it is prohibited to eat small amount of any prohibited substance), there is a minimum amount which is required to obligate someone in the penalty of karet and even when the eating is allowed because one is ill, we try to avoid having someone eat this amount of food. The 9 minute waiting period allows us to view the small amounts eaten each time as two separate episodes of eating rather than one continuous one. Similarly, when it comes to drinking, one measures out one cheek full of liquid before Yom Kippur and can drink a little less than this amount every 9 minutes.
However, the Shulchan Aruch is explicit that if we think these measurements won’t be enough for the sick person, or if the sick person says they won’t be enough or if we have any doubt about the matter at all – we feed the sick person whatever food and drink is necessary. [i.e. the whole issue of measured amounts only applies when it’s a planned response to a condition noted before Yom Kippur but not when there is any doubt about the adequacy of the approach].
One halachic point to add to the discussion: the Shulchan Aruch paskans that if someone has to eat on Yom Kippur, he/she has to bentch and add Ya’aleh v’yavoh in the bentching. The Taz questions this saying that it’s not possible we would refer to Yom Kippur after eating on it. Rav Akiva Eger actually takes it a step further than on a Yom Kippur which falls on shabbat, not only would you bentch, you would have to say kiddush before eating anything, just like you would any other shabbat.
Aggadata
The Gemara quotes different sources to substantiate that pikuach nefesh comes before keeping the usual prohibitions of shabbat. One source is the logic that you violate this shabbat to allow the keeping of future shabbatot, meaning that shabbat is there for us to keep and if keeping it now will prevent us from keeping it in the future, that is not what is meant to happen. A second source quoted it the verse “ v’chai bahem “ – that we are to live by God’s laws and not die by them.
The mishna in Avot says that Man is beloved because he is created “b’tzelem.” What does “b’tzelem” mean? Rambam in the first chapter of his Moreh Nevuchim says it refers to man’s intellect. Rashi explains similarly that man’s uniqueness lies in his intellect and power of speech. The Rambam’s explanation of tzelem leaves open the question – is this a reason that man is greater than the animals or is there more – that man is greater than even the angels b/c even man’s physical side is part of the tzelem referred to? (and the Rambam himself raises this question in his Moreh). The Maharal answers that even the physical is part of the greatness of man, and the Maharal gives two examples of this – though we could develop more. One is that while the ape walks hunched over, man walks upright. Man’s posture reflects his rule over the world and shows the majesty of God over creation. A second – a human’s face gives off a light that other creatures don’t. And this could be the explanation of the comment in Baba Metzia (58b-59a) that one who causes his friend’s face to whiten (embarrasses him), it is as if he has killed him – by causing the color to drain from one’s face in the act of embarrassment, one has removed the Godly quality of the person in that sense.
The mishna in Sanhedrin addresses the question – why was man created alone in the world (the mishna’s context is one of putting the fear of lying in witnesses – see the mishna for further context)? It says to show that anyone who destroys or causes to be lost a single human being it is as if an entire world has been destroyed. Meaning, each person is created with the tzelem of God and each person is a unique embodiment of this tzelem. So each person has value unique to him/her that another person would not have.
We have to view our relationships with our fellow man in this way. Each person has a value unique to him/her and we have to do all that we can to appreciate this person and certainly nothing to take away from that person.
Halacha
Yoma 82a – mishna and gemara there
Yoma 83a – brayita ‘Tanu rabbanan mi sheachazo bulmos’
Yerushalmi Yoma 8:5 – ‘vhazariz mishtabeyach’
Rif on Yoma and the Ran ‘ vgarsinan bgemara mi sheachazo bulmos ‘ and the Rosh there. Ba’al Ma’or ‘vha dtanu rabbanan.’ Gemara Menachot 47a re: choleh sheamduhu lshtei grugarot
Shayalot U’teshuvot HaRashba 689
Rambam Shabbat 2:1 and the Kesef Mishne there
Pesachim 77a ‘savruah d’kulei alma tumah dechuya’ and Rashi ‘ dechuya ‘ there
Tur Orach Chayim 328 re: choleh dtzarich lbasar
Shulchan Aruch 328:14, Magen Avraham 9, Taz 6
Shulchan Aruch 618: 7-9, Magen Avraham 10, Taz 10, and see Rabbi Akiva Eger there
Aggadata
Yoma 85b – the sources for pikuach nefesh being doche shabbat
Avot 3:14, Maharal in Derech Hachayim there, Moreh Nevuchim 1:1, Tiferent Yisrael there
Sanhedrin mishna 4:5
Baba Metzia 58b-59a – regarding ‘malbin pnei chaveiru brabim’
Yoma 85b – the mishna regarding sins against one’s fellow man
The Talmud in Tractate Yoma, _____, has the statement that pikuach nefesh – a threat to one’s life – pushes away or takes precedence over any law – except for three sins (Rav Granatstein referred to them as ‘defining’ sins): idol worship, prohibited relationships, and taking the life of another. This shiur will discuss pikuach nefesh as it relates to shabbat and yom kippur.
One can make a distinction between two types of pikuach nefesh: a chronic threat to one’s life versus an acute threat to one’s life. A chronic threat is one that any shul rabbi will have come across. Someone knows in advance of Yom Kippur that he/she must eat, as per the doctor, or else it’s a threat to one’s life. And this is easy to deal with in that there is a known chemical balance one must have and you can plan accordingly that the person will eat/drink what is necessary over the course of the day. What and however much the doctor says must be eaten what is eaten (we will discuss the issue of the shiurim – measurements – a bit later).
The second type of pikuach nefesh – that of an acute threat – is one where there is no planning. Someone appears faint on Yom Kippur, for example. In this scenario you act immediately to relieve the issue, with whatever it takes. The mishna in Yoma discusses a pregnant woman who is feeling ill on Yom Kippur and asks specifically for non-kosher meat, and it says you give it to her. The Talmud elaborates steps you take to introduce it to her, first allowing her to taste it and then, if she is not better, to eat it, etc. But you do give it to her. A later brayita there follows with a case of someone suffering from Bulmos which again you treat as a life-threatening ailment. [Rambam translates bulmos as an epileptic attack and in practice, we treat someone suffering an epileptic seizure as a pikuach nefesh].
Raavad was asked the following question: someone is sick on shabbat and asks for some chicken. You have an option of a non-Jew killing a chicken and giving this meat to the sick person or a Jewish person can schecht a chicken and this can be given. On the one hand, you have the sick person eating non-kosher, but the person is a pikuach nefesh so it should be allowed. And the other option would allow him/her to eat kosher but you would have a Jewish person performing a violation of the Sabbath (schechting). Raavad says you have a Jewish person schecht the chicken. His logic is that the rule that pikuach nefesh will push away prohibitions applies specifically to those actions which, when forbidden, prevent the sick person from being treated. In this example, the action which is prohibited is the killing of the animal on Shabbat and this is the action that is now allowed. Eating non-kosher food is not the issue at hand (as there is kosher food available) and this action would not be allowed under these circumstances.
The Ran addresses the same question of the Raavad and arrives at the same conclusion, but his reasoning is different. The Ran says that when it comes to pikuach nefesh pushing away prohibitions, one must take a quantitative approach to the number of prohibitions being broken with each avenue of responding to situation. In this example, once a Jewish person has schechted the animal, there are no further violations of the law. However, if non-kosher food is given to the sick person, every k’zayit or morsel of food that is eaten is another breaking of the transgression of not eating kosher. Granted, pikuach nefesh allows prohibited actions but one must still take into account the prohibited actions and determine the way to do the fewest.
The Ba’al Ma’or cites a case which can serve as a proof text to the Ran’s opinion […]
The Ran’s opinion lends itself to a more general discussion that happens in this context, and that is – when we say that pikuach nefesh will push away other halachic institutions, is such an institution now ‘dechuya’ or ‘hutra.’ Dechuya means that the institution is still at play and you are allowed to violate that institution to save human life. Hutra means that in effect – the institution is no longer in play, at least with anything germane to the issue at hand of saving the person’s life. In either approach, one can do whatever is necessary to save a life. However, once there is a choice of options how to proceed, when the institution at hand is dechuya, you have to weigh which of your options is the least offensive to the institution. The Ran, by stating that we have to start weighing which avenue will have the fewest violations of Shabbat law, is taking a dechuya approach to the situation. [For the Ran, even if there is prepared non-kosher meat, he still says it’s preferable to have Jewish person schecht the animal rather than having the multiple violations of eating non-kosher food.]
The Rosh, discussing the same issues as the Ran, believes the institution is hutra. The Maharam M’Rotenberg gives three answers to the question of the Ran: 1) someone who was brought up eating kosher would not be able to stomach eating non-kosher meat so practically speaking, you would have to schecht the animal. (Rav Granatstein described this answer as a ‘ba’al batesh’ one in that it doesn’t address the fundamental issues at hand but takes a practical look at it). 2) [ . . . ] This second answer is taking the approach that the prohibition is hutra and anything can be done. 3) “it’s impossible that there is no child at the end of the earth.” This answer is unclear. Rav Granatstein reads it as following the second answer and saying: there’s always a sick child or someone in labor, somewhere, and if our law didn’t allow for these situations to be addressed on shabbat or yom kippur, it would be too difficult for us to live by.
The Sha’alot U’teshuvot of the Rashba refers to the first answer of the Maharam and then gives his own opinion. He gets to the core of our discussion and says the question hinges on whether or not it is dechuya or hutra. And the Rashba believes the halacha is that shabbos is dechuya only. [The Rashba brings into the discussion the related topic of whether tum’ah is hutra or dechuya for communal issues. In the course of the service in the Temple, an impure person or animal could bring impurity to utensils or parts of the animal used in the service. The Rashba’s example, quoting from the gemara, is where there are two bowls of blood – one of which we know to be impure – and the service at hand is related to a communal sacrifice. Can you use the bowl of blood that you know to be impure or not? To do so would mean you believe that the prohibitions related to impurity in the Temple and service are hutra in the context of communal sacrifice. In this context, Rav Granatstein cited a Rashi in Pesachim 79a, Rashi ‘Tum’ah dechuya hi b’tzibur’ which he described as an interesting formulation: it is with difficulty that it was allowed and whenever it is possible to find a pure item or to deal with impurity of a lower severity, we try to do so. The list of sources for the shiur refers to Rashi on 77a which defines ‘dechuya’ in the usual sense, but this was not cited in the shiur itself].
Rambam states clearly that shabbat is ‘Dechuya.’ The Kesef Mishna on the Rambam cites the Rashi, the Rashba, and the Ran and connects the issues of dechuya/hutra by a danger to life and dechuya/hutra by impurity.
Tur seems to paskan hutra and all is allowed, which would make sense in his siding with the Rosh noted above. The Bet Yosef gives two reasons for the Tur’s psak. One – like the Maharam. Two – like the Ran. Meaning the Bet Yosef believes that one can understand the Tur that shabbat is dechuya or is hutra.
Returning to the chronic sickness we noted above where one can plan for it, the Shulchan Aruch brings the halacha that one eats less than 2/3 of an egg (the estimated size of a ‘grugarat’) and waits the time it would take to eat 4 eggs worth of food. The Chatam Sofer gave this a time of 9 minutes. The background for this is that while it is prohibited to eat even a small amount of food on Yom Kippur (as it is prohibited to eat small amount of any prohibited substance), there is a minimum amount which is required to obligate someone in the penalty of karet and even when the eating is allowed because one is ill, we try to avoid having someone eat this amount of food. The 9 minute waiting period allows us to view the small amounts eaten each time as two separate episodes of eating rather than one continuous one. Similarly, when it comes to drinking, one measures out one cheek full of liquid before Yom Kippur and can drink a little less than this amount every 9 minutes.
However, the Shulchan Aruch is explicit that if we think these measurements won’t be enough for the sick person, or if the sick person says they won’t be enough or if we have any doubt about the matter at all – we feed the sick person whatever food and drink is necessary. [i.e. the whole issue of measured amounts only applies when it’s a planned response to a condition noted before Yom Kippur but not when there is any doubt about the adequacy of the approach].
One halachic point to add to the discussion: the Shulchan Aruch paskans that if someone has to eat on Yom Kippur, he/she has to bentch and add Ya’aleh v’yavoh in the bentching. The Taz questions this saying that it’s not possible we would refer to Yom Kippur after eating on it. Rav Akiva Eger actually takes it a step further than on a Yom Kippur which falls on shabbat, not only would you bentch, you would have to say kiddush before eating anything, just like you would any other shabbat.
Aggadata
The Gemara quotes different sources to substantiate that pikuach nefesh comes before keeping the usual prohibitions of shabbat. One source is the logic that you violate this shabbat to allow the keeping of future shabbatot, meaning that shabbat is there for us to keep and if keeping it now will prevent us from keeping it in the future, that is not what is meant to happen. A second source quoted it the verse “ v’chai bahem “ – that we are to live by God’s laws and not die by them.
The mishna in Avot says that Man is beloved because he is created “b’tzelem.” What does “b’tzelem” mean? Rambam in the first chapter of his Moreh Nevuchim says it refers to man’s intellect. Rashi explains similarly that man’s uniqueness lies in his intellect and power of speech. The Rambam’s explanation of tzelem leaves open the question – is this a reason that man is greater than the animals or is there more – that man is greater than even the angels b/c even man’s physical side is part of the tzelem referred to? (and the Rambam himself raises this question in his Moreh). The Maharal answers that even the physical is part of the greatness of man, and the Maharal gives two examples of this – though we could develop more. One is that while the ape walks hunched over, man walks upright. Man’s posture reflects his rule over the world and shows the majesty of God over creation. A second – a human’s face gives off a light that other creatures don’t. And this could be the explanation of the comment in Baba Metzia (58b-59a) that one who causes his friend’s face to whiten (embarrasses him), it is as if he has killed him – by causing the color to drain from one’s face in the act of embarrassment, one has removed the Godly quality of the person in that sense.
The mishna in Sanhedrin addresses the question – why was man created alone in the world (the mishna’s context is one of putting the fear of lying in witnesses – see the mishna for further context)? It says to show that anyone who destroys or causes to be lost a single human being it is as if an entire world has been destroyed. Meaning, each person is created with the tzelem of God and each person is a unique embodiment of this tzelem. So each person has value unique to him/her that another person would not have.
We have to view our relationships with our fellow man in this way. Each person has a value unique to him/her and we have to do all that we can to appreciate this person and certainly nothing to take away from that person.
Sunday, September 2, 2007
Shabbat Parshat Ki Tavo
The parasha includes the Tochacha. This is the second Tochacha in the Torah, the first being in parashat Bechukotai. Looking at the context of the one in Bechukotai will allow us to compare and contrast the Tochacha in our parasha – and lead to a better understanding of what it is all about and the meaning we can take away from it today.
The Tochacha in parashat Bechukotai comes as a culmination of the brit – covenant – entered into by Hashem and the Jewish people. We are given the Torah with the expectation that we will keep it. The list of bad things that will happen to us is a statement that we should treat our covenant seriously or else. [In relatively modern times, we have unearthed evidence of britot entered into in ancient times where this type of structure was the normal way of arranging things where – after laying out what the agreement was – the two parties would end saying,’ and if you don’t follow through, then all of these bad things should happen to you . . . ‘]. Viewing the Tochacha as the culimation of the brit at Sinai allows us to understand better some other psukim in Sefer Vayikra.
Vayikra open with ‘Vayikra Hashem el Moshe’ – And Hashem called to Moshe. The word Vayikra ends with an ‘aleph zuta’ – a small aleph. Rashi notes that the language of calling to Moshe is a call for T'midut – consistency – in the service of Hashem. The small aleph is emphasizing the need for this consistency; if you take the aleph away, you are left with Vayiker which implies inconsistent, happenstance service. The Tochacha in Bechukotai emphasizes the result of our following Hashem bkeri. This then highlights the connection from our receiving Hashem’s Word in the Sinai desert to Hashem calling upon us (as demonstrated with Moshe) to serve him consistently to the result of our not serving him in this way being described in the Tochacha.
Another portion of Sefer Vayikra becomes clearer when looked at in this light. Parashat Behar opens with the laws of Shmita, emphasizing that these were given at Sinai. Rashi and the other commentaries deal with the question why is Sinai mentioned here – we had finished our discussion of Sinai back in Sefer Shemot? But in the context of our structure above, Behar is emphasizing the connection between Sinai and the Tochacha – that the Sinai brit was entered into on the condition of our consistency. What was given at Sinai is very much relevant in Sefer Vayikra as we look to close it out with the Tochacah.
[Rav Granatstein commented that he read Goetz’s A History of the Jews when he was a teenager and he remembered there was a line that impacted on him very much. Goetz commented that if you look at the detail in the Tochacha, every single thing mentioned had happened to the Jewish people in the course of our history.]
Looking at the Tochacha in our parasha, we don’t have the same type of context, but there is a context nonetheless. The parasha is describing Moshe’s telling the people what they will do when they enter the land. 6 tribes will go up Har Eyval, 6 on Har Grizim, and the kohanim will be in between them. Moshe then describes a list of 11 ‘arurs’ – or curses – that will be said in some sort of communal fashion and follows with the parasha of the tochacha. The tochacha parasha itself begins with a list of blessings we will receive if we follow God’s Word and then list of bad things that will happen to us if we do not. [Refer to the verses inside for the exact detail]. Later in Sefer Yehoshua (8:33), we have the fulfillment of the first part of this detail – with Yehoshua splitting the tribes, leaving the kohanim in the middle.
The commentaries disagree how exactly the 11 curses were said. In describing the process, Moshe says (v 12-13) that the tribes on Har Grizim will be standing to bless the people and the tribes on Har Eyval will be standing to curse. What exactly comprised this blessing that Moshe refers to is at the heart of the debate. Rashi, citing the Gemara in Sotah 42a, explains that for each curse listed, a two-part responsive form was said. Taking the first curse as an example – one who makes an idol in secret – the leviim would turn to one mountain (with six tribes on it) and say, ‘blessed is the one who does not make an idol in secret,’ and all the tribes would answer ‘Amen.’ They would then turn to the other mountain and say, ‘cursed is the one who makes an idol in secret,’ and all the tribes would answer ‘Amen.’ And this process was repeated for all eleven of the curses. Targum (Yonatan ben Uziel) modifies this slightly, saying the dual blessing and curse for each statement was done only for the first and last of the curses. But for the remaining curses, they were simply stated as is.
Ibn Ezra cites the explanation of the Gemara Sotah and then says that the pshat (not like the Gemara) is as follows: the blessing being referred to doesn’t refer at all to the 11 curses that are listed. Rather, it’s the blessings (28:1-14) that immediately precede the punishments of the tochacha. And the curse that’s referred to are the punishments of the tochacha – the opposites of the blessings that are referred to.
The Ibn Ezra (27:15) then explains why these 11 curses were said in the first place, that they can be done ‘b’seter’ – or in secret. [Refer to the Ibn Ezra where he details how each one is secretive and not public]. Rav Granatstein portrayed this as the people – now entering a new covenant with Hashem – admitting that they have no control over what people do in private. All they can do is publicly state that anyone who transgresses should be cursed. The blessings and punishments that follow are within the realm of what they can control in public life – to make sure all are following the Torah. This idea is echoed in the next week’s parasha – Parashat Nitzavim – where the verse states that the hidden things are for God alone and the revealed or public ones are for us. There is another difference between the tochacha here and the one in Sefer Vayikra – ours is written in the singular form, directed to individuals. What we have here is each individual accepting responsibility for the community as a whole. This sense of responsibility for community and its adherence to Torah is something we must all be aware of and work toward.
The Tochacha in parashat Bechukotai comes as a culmination of the brit – covenant – entered into by Hashem and the Jewish people. We are given the Torah with the expectation that we will keep it. The list of bad things that will happen to us is a statement that we should treat our covenant seriously or else. [In relatively modern times, we have unearthed evidence of britot entered into in ancient times where this type of structure was the normal way of arranging things where – after laying out what the agreement was – the two parties would end saying,’ and if you don’t follow through, then all of these bad things should happen to you . . . ‘]. Viewing the Tochacha as the culimation of the brit at Sinai allows us to understand better some other psukim in Sefer Vayikra.
Vayikra open with ‘Vayikra Hashem el Moshe’ – And Hashem called to Moshe. The word Vayikra ends with an ‘aleph zuta’ – a small aleph. Rashi notes that the language of calling to Moshe is a call for T'midut – consistency – in the service of Hashem. The small aleph is emphasizing the need for this consistency; if you take the aleph away, you are left with Vayiker which implies inconsistent, happenstance service. The Tochacha in Bechukotai emphasizes the result of our following Hashem bkeri. This then highlights the connection from our receiving Hashem’s Word in the Sinai desert to Hashem calling upon us (as demonstrated with Moshe) to serve him consistently to the result of our not serving him in this way being described in the Tochacha.
Another portion of Sefer Vayikra becomes clearer when looked at in this light. Parashat Behar opens with the laws of Shmita, emphasizing that these were given at Sinai. Rashi and the other commentaries deal with the question why is Sinai mentioned here – we had finished our discussion of Sinai back in Sefer Shemot? But in the context of our structure above, Behar is emphasizing the connection between Sinai and the Tochacha – that the Sinai brit was entered into on the condition of our consistency. What was given at Sinai is very much relevant in Sefer Vayikra as we look to close it out with the Tochacah.
[Rav Granatstein commented that he read Goetz’s A History of the Jews when he was a teenager and he remembered there was a line that impacted on him very much. Goetz commented that if you look at the detail in the Tochacha, every single thing mentioned had happened to the Jewish people in the course of our history.]
Looking at the Tochacha in our parasha, we don’t have the same type of context, but there is a context nonetheless. The parasha is describing Moshe’s telling the people what they will do when they enter the land. 6 tribes will go up Har Eyval, 6 on Har Grizim, and the kohanim will be in between them. Moshe then describes a list of 11 ‘arurs’ – or curses – that will be said in some sort of communal fashion and follows with the parasha of the tochacha. The tochacha parasha itself begins with a list of blessings we will receive if we follow God’s Word and then list of bad things that will happen to us if we do not. [Refer to the verses inside for the exact detail]. Later in Sefer Yehoshua (8:33), we have the fulfillment of the first part of this detail – with Yehoshua splitting the tribes, leaving the kohanim in the middle.
The commentaries disagree how exactly the 11 curses were said. In describing the process, Moshe says (v 12-13) that the tribes on Har Grizim will be standing to bless the people and the tribes on Har Eyval will be standing to curse. What exactly comprised this blessing that Moshe refers to is at the heart of the debate. Rashi, citing the Gemara in Sotah 42a, explains that for each curse listed, a two-part responsive form was said. Taking the first curse as an example – one who makes an idol in secret – the leviim would turn to one mountain (with six tribes on it) and say, ‘blessed is the one who does not make an idol in secret,’ and all the tribes would answer ‘Amen.’ They would then turn to the other mountain and say, ‘cursed is the one who makes an idol in secret,’ and all the tribes would answer ‘Amen.’ And this process was repeated for all eleven of the curses. Targum (Yonatan ben Uziel) modifies this slightly, saying the dual blessing and curse for each statement was done only for the first and last of the curses. But for the remaining curses, they were simply stated as is.
Ibn Ezra cites the explanation of the Gemara Sotah and then says that the pshat (not like the Gemara) is as follows: the blessing being referred to doesn’t refer at all to the 11 curses that are listed. Rather, it’s the blessings (28:1-14) that immediately precede the punishments of the tochacha. And the curse that’s referred to are the punishments of the tochacha – the opposites of the blessings that are referred to.
The Ibn Ezra (27:15) then explains why these 11 curses were said in the first place, that they can be done ‘b’seter’ – or in secret. [Refer to the Ibn Ezra where he details how each one is secretive and not public]. Rav Granatstein portrayed this as the people – now entering a new covenant with Hashem – admitting that they have no control over what people do in private. All they can do is publicly state that anyone who transgresses should be cursed. The blessings and punishments that follow are within the realm of what they can control in public life – to make sure all are following the Torah. This idea is echoed in the next week’s parasha – Parashat Nitzavim – where the verse states that the hidden things are for God alone and the revealed or public ones are for us. There is another difference between the tochacha here and the one in Sefer Vayikra – ours is written in the singular form, directed to individuals. What we have here is each individual accepting responsibility for the community as a whole. This sense of responsibility for community and its adherence to Torah is something we must all be aware of and work toward.
Sunday, August 26, 2007
Shabbat Parshat Ki Tetzei
Parashat Ki Teitzei is different from the rest of Sefer Devarim. The sefer as a whole is made up of numerous addresses by Moshe to the people. Parashat Ki Teitzei stands out in that it is made up of staccato-like pieces each addressing a different mitzvah or topic. Within the parasha, there is a certain flow from piece to piece, but it does stand out from the rest of the sefer. It is similar in nature to Parashat Mishpatim in Sefer Shemot which also is made up of staccato-like pieces. We will focus on one mitzvah in the parasha – that of the Yefat Toar.
The description of the Yefat Toar raises some moral and halachic issues. First – the man seems to be forcing himself on the woman during the battle and the Torah is condoning it. Second, the woman must undergo a conversion to marry the man and this appears to be regardless of what she wants – or against her will, something we don’t allow in conversion. We will look at how the Gemara and the Rishonim deal with these issues.
The Torah describes how when a man at war will see a beautiful woman, he is to take her home. Her hair is shaved. ‘Vi'asata et tziparneha’ – regarding her nails, he either allows them to grow long, in the sense that she is in mourning for her family; or, he pares them down, similar to what is done to her hair. The Torah continues that if he chooses not to marry her, then he must set her free ‘tachat asher inita’ – due to the pain that he caused her (we will return to this piece later).
[As background, we know that the common practice in ancient civilizations was that captured people were sold into slavery. The Torah here is separating out our treatment of this woman from what would have been standard practice in earlier times.]
One issue that is discussed is: When is the first time that the man has relations with the woman? The Talmud Bavli, on the simple level of understanding the Gemara, says that the man forces himself on her when he first takes her and then again after she completes the process described in the Torah [Ramban is the one who notes that this is the ‘peshat’ understanding in the Gemara]. Rashi explains the Gemara to mean he never sleeps with her until after the process has been completed. Ramban as well, though admitting this is not the simple meaning of the Gemara, reads the Gemara like Rashi does. The Talmud Yerushalmi understands that he sleeps with her twice - once on the battlefield and then again after she has gone through the whole process of the Yefat Toar.
This issue of whether there is an initial act of relations against her will is also relevant to explaining the reason she goes free if the man doesn’t want to marry her. The pasuk says ‘tachat asher inita.’ Some of the commentaries understand that this refers to the woman being tormented – forced to grow her nails, have her head shaved, etc. Rashbam explains it means because he had relations with her against her will when he first took her.
A second issue discussed is the woman’s conversion to Judaism. Everyone agrees that the woman has to convert if the man marries her. Normally, we assume that a conversion cannot be against someone’s will. So much so, that when a non-Jewish child is adopted and converted, it is done ‘al da’at bet din.’ We require consent and we allow that of bet din to suffice, but the child has the option when he/she comes of age to determine that he/she did not want to convert. How then do we allow a forced conversion in this case? Most of the commentaries describe it as an exception to the rule. [In a similar vein to how the Torah allows forced relations, according to some above, in these laws, there is an exception here allowing the forced conversion]. The Rambam takes a different tack. He learns that at the end of the process, the woman has a right of final refusal – that there is no exception. (Hilchot Milachim 8:7)
Underlying the mitzva of Yefat Toar is the notion that we have to live with the consequences of our actions. He can choose to have her, but he must be prepared for the consequences of bringing her into his home. One of the reasons the man brings her to his house may be so that his family will see her and there will be dialogue between them and the man; it may cause him to realize the consequences of what he is doing. The notion of being prepared to live with the consequences of one’s actions is an important one.
The description of the Yefat Toar raises some moral and halachic issues. First – the man seems to be forcing himself on the woman during the battle and the Torah is condoning it. Second, the woman must undergo a conversion to marry the man and this appears to be regardless of what she wants – or against her will, something we don’t allow in conversion. We will look at how the Gemara and the Rishonim deal with these issues.
The Torah describes how when a man at war will see a beautiful woman, he is to take her home. Her hair is shaved. ‘Vi'asata et tziparneha’ – regarding her nails, he either allows them to grow long, in the sense that she is in mourning for her family; or, he pares them down, similar to what is done to her hair. The Torah continues that if he chooses not to marry her, then he must set her free ‘tachat asher inita’ – due to the pain that he caused her (we will return to this piece later).
[As background, we know that the common practice in ancient civilizations was that captured people were sold into slavery. The Torah here is separating out our treatment of this woman from what would have been standard practice in earlier times.]
One issue that is discussed is: When is the first time that the man has relations with the woman? The Talmud Bavli, on the simple level of understanding the Gemara, says that the man forces himself on her when he first takes her and then again after she completes the process described in the Torah [Ramban is the one who notes that this is the ‘peshat’ understanding in the Gemara]. Rashi explains the Gemara to mean he never sleeps with her until after the process has been completed. Ramban as well, though admitting this is not the simple meaning of the Gemara, reads the Gemara like Rashi does. The Talmud Yerushalmi understands that he sleeps with her twice - once on the battlefield and then again after she has gone through the whole process of the Yefat Toar.
This issue of whether there is an initial act of relations against her will is also relevant to explaining the reason she goes free if the man doesn’t want to marry her. The pasuk says ‘tachat asher inita.’ Some of the commentaries understand that this refers to the woman being tormented – forced to grow her nails, have her head shaved, etc. Rashbam explains it means because he had relations with her against her will when he first took her.
A second issue discussed is the woman’s conversion to Judaism. Everyone agrees that the woman has to convert if the man marries her. Normally, we assume that a conversion cannot be against someone’s will. So much so, that when a non-Jewish child is adopted and converted, it is done ‘al da’at bet din.’ We require consent and we allow that of bet din to suffice, but the child has the option when he/she comes of age to determine that he/she did not want to convert. How then do we allow a forced conversion in this case? Most of the commentaries describe it as an exception to the rule. [In a similar vein to how the Torah allows forced relations, according to some above, in these laws, there is an exception here allowing the forced conversion]. The Rambam takes a different tack. He learns that at the end of the process, the woman has a right of final refusal – that there is no exception. (Hilchot Milachim 8:7)
Underlying the mitzva of Yefat Toar is the notion that we have to live with the consequences of our actions. He can choose to have her, but he must be prepared for the consequences of bringing her into his home. One of the reasons the man brings her to his house may be so that his family will see her and there will be dialogue between them and the man; it may cause him to realize the consequences of what he is doing. The notion of being prepared to live with the consequences of one’s actions is an important one.
Thursday, August 23, 2007
Shabbat Parshat Shoftim
[Refer to ch 18, v 9-22] The parasha lists a number of practices of the inhabitants of Canaan that we are not to emulate. One of the examples given is one who passes his child ‘between the fires.’ [There are two possibilities how to understand this example – either that there was some sort of initiation rite in a pagan worship of passing a child between two flames or actual human sacrifices. Rav Dovid Tzvi Hoffman believes the latter to be the correct understanding.] Following that example, the Torah lists examples where the Canaanites would attempt to discover the future – through astrology, reading signs, or trying to communicate with the dead. After listing all of these examples, the Torah continues ‘ki toavat Hashem kol oseh eleh . . .’ – because it is an abomination to Hashem for all who do these . . .’ [we will return to the bolded words later] and goes on to say that instead, the Jewish people will have prophets into whose mouths Hashem Himself will place His word and information.
The distinction drawn here between the ways of the Canaanites and the ways of the Jewish people is reminiscent of the interplay in Parashat Balak between Bil’am and the Jewish people. In v 23:23, Bil’am states ‘ki lo nachash b’Yaakov v’lo kesem b’Yisroel . . .’ – for there is no divination in Yaakov and no sorcery in Yisroel. We have a similar statement made in our parasha by Moshe to the people (18:14), ‘ki hagoyim ha’eleh asher ata yoresh otam el m’oniniim v’el kosmim yishmauh, v’ata lo ken natan lecha Hashem e’lokecha’ – because these nations that you [Bnei Yisrael] are inheriting them, they turn to [these types of divination and sorcery, but Hashem doesn’t have you practice this].
There is debate in our Tradition as to the efficacy of these different methods of foretelling the future. The Rambam groups them all together as nonsense and includes them in the laws of idolatry for anyone who practices them. In this regard, Rambam was unique – at least within the Jewish tradition – in dismissing the value of these practices. Even the Ibn Ezra for example – one of the great rationalists – believed that astrology had truth to it. Taking the Rambam’s approach in the command, the command is saying that these attempts at divination are nonsense and idolatrous. The only method of looking to the future that has meaning and is allowed is through Hashem or His messenger – the prophet.
The Ramban takes issue with the Rambam on this understanding (see Ramban 18:9). The Ramban understands that these methods were effective in foretelling the future and in this regard was very much in the mainstream of our Sages at the time. He details the accepted science of the time (to which the Rambam ascribed as well) that the heavens are composed of spheres each of which has a ministering intelligence governing it. Some of these types of divination allow you to impact on how these ministering intelligences operate and in effect – change the future.
Given his approach, the Ramban understands the prohibition differently from Rambam. The Ramban sees a value in some of the practices listed. This approach leads to some questions that the Ramban must deal with that the Rambam does not. For example, the verse refers to ‘kol oseh eleh.’ Rashi cites the teaching from our Sages that since the Torah does not say ‘one who does all these’ but rather says ‘all who do these’ – it teaches us that one will transgress even by attempting one of these practices. The Ramban, however, reads the verse in a way to give credence or value to at least some of the practices. He reads the same inference to say that not all of these practices fall within the characterization of ‘toevah´ or abomination, which precedes the phrase ‘kol oseh eleh.’ (i.e. Not ‘all of these’ are an abomination, only some). Some of the practices are legitimate in that they work. [Rav Granatstein described this as a very powerful explanation on the part of the Ramban.] However, we aren’t allowed to use them.
The Ramban then has to explain why we cannot follow the practices. For the Rambam, it’s clear that they are nonsense with no basis – and therefore following them with a belief that they have power is idolatrous. But for the Ramban, who indicates that at least some do work – why can’t we follow them? For this, the Ramban turns to the model of kla’im – the prohibition of breeding two animals or plants together. In Vayikra (19:19), the Ramban develops the meaning of this prohibition, explaining that God wants us to preserve nature and to allow the world to run its course. Attempting to crossbreed, for example, has two negative implications a) the person believes there is more to create than what God created, that the world is imperfect b) the offspring of such a union – such as the mule – cannot itself have children and this means the breeder took something with the power to create new life and used it to generate something that cannot; such sterilization destroys the natural order of things.
So too, in regard to our parasha, the prohibition is against attempting to use the natural forces to change how nature is running – to move the spheres a certain way, etc.
In codifying these laws, the placement of the prohibition(s) is key. The Rambam includes them in the laws of idolatry. The Tur separates them from the laws of idolatry by inserting the laws of ‘ribbis’ – charging interest in between. Rav Granatstein believes the Tur is seeking to accent the fact that these practices are not idolatrous – against the approach taken by the Rambam.
[This argument between Rambam and Ramban plays itself out in other contexts as well. ‘Shaydim’ – demonic figures – for example. These appear in different parts of the Gemara. Rambam is consistent in saying they don’t exist. Ramban, and those with his approach, don’t necessarily say that. One example of this is found in the response of the Radvaz, printed at the end of the laws of men not dressing in women’s clothes (Yoreh Deah, 182). The Radvaz addresses the question of one who believes in shaydim and offers incense to them – not to deify them but to cause them to act in a way beneficial to the person.]
The Ramah in Yoreh Deah (179:1) cites the verse ‘Tamim tihiyeh im Hashem Elokecha’ (a verse from our parasha) to explain the prohibition of looking to these practices to seek the future. Whatever your approach to them – that they are nonsense or just against the natural order – our approach as the Jewish people must be to be tamim – to have courage. Our courage derives from belief in God and the impact of his Hand in the world. Those who seek these forms of divination do so out of fear or terror. We must not be afraid to face the world.-HG
The distinction drawn here between the ways of the Canaanites and the ways of the Jewish people is reminiscent of the interplay in Parashat Balak between Bil’am and the Jewish people. In v 23:23, Bil’am states ‘ki lo nachash b’Yaakov v’lo kesem b’Yisroel . . .’ – for there is no divination in Yaakov and no sorcery in Yisroel. We have a similar statement made in our parasha by Moshe to the people (18:14), ‘ki hagoyim ha’eleh asher ata yoresh otam el m’oniniim v’el kosmim yishmauh, v’ata lo ken natan lecha Hashem e’lokecha’ – because these nations that you [Bnei Yisrael] are inheriting them, they turn to [these types of divination and sorcery, but Hashem doesn’t have you practice this].
There is debate in our Tradition as to the efficacy of these different methods of foretelling the future. The Rambam groups them all together as nonsense and includes them in the laws of idolatry for anyone who practices them. In this regard, Rambam was unique – at least within the Jewish tradition – in dismissing the value of these practices. Even the Ibn Ezra for example – one of the great rationalists – believed that astrology had truth to it. Taking the Rambam’s approach in the command, the command is saying that these attempts at divination are nonsense and idolatrous. The only method of looking to the future that has meaning and is allowed is through Hashem or His messenger – the prophet.
The Ramban takes issue with the Rambam on this understanding (see Ramban 18:9). The Ramban understands that these methods were effective in foretelling the future and in this regard was very much in the mainstream of our Sages at the time. He details the accepted science of the time (to which the Rambam ascribed as well) that the heavens are composed of spheres each of which has a ministering intelligence governing it. Some of these types of divination allow you to impact on how these ministering intelligences operate and in effect – change the future.
Given his approach, the Ramban understands the prohibition differently from Rambam. The Ramban sees a value in some of the practices listed. This approach leads to some questions that the Ramban must deal with that the Rambam does not. For example, the verse refers to ‘kol oseh eleh.’ Rashi cites the teaching from our Sages that since the Torah does not say ‘one who does all these’ but rather says ‘all who do these’ – it teaches us that one will transgress even by attempting one of these practices. The Ramban, however, reads the verse in a way to give credence or value to at least some of the practices. He reads the same inference to say that not all of these practices fall within the characterization of ‘toevah´ or abomination, which precedes the phrase ‘kol oseh eleh.’ (i.e. Not ‘all of these’ are an abomination, only some). Some of the practices are legitimate in that they work. [Rav Granatstein described this as a very powerful explanation on the part of the Ramban.] However, we aren’t allowed to use them.
The Ramban then has to explain why we cannot follow the practices. For the Rambam, it’s clear that they are nonsense with no basis – and therefore following them with a belief that they have power is idolatrous. But for the Ramban, who indicates that at least some do work – why can’t we follow them? For this, the Ramban turns to the model of kla’im – the prohibition of breeding two animals or plants together. In Vayikra (19:19), the Ramban develops the meaning of this prohibition, explaining that God wants us to preserve nature and to allow the world to run its course. Attempting to crossbreed, for example, has two negative implications a) the person believes there is more to create than what God created, that the world is imperfect b) the offspring of such a union – such as the mule – cannot itself have children and this means the breeder took something with the power to create new life and used it to generate something that cannot; such sterilization destroys the natural order of things.
So too, in regard to our parasha, the prohibition is against attempting to use the natural forces to change how nature is running – to move the spheres a certain way, etc.
In codifying these laws, the placement of the prohibition(s) is key. The Rambam includes them in the laws of idolatry. The Tur separates them from the laws of idolatry by inserting the laws of ‘ribbis’ – charging interest in between. Rav Granatstein believes the Tur is seeking to accent the fact that these practices are not idolatrous – against the approach taken by the Rambam.
[This argument between Rambam and Ramban plays itself out in other contexts as well. ‘Shaydim’ – demonic figures – for example. These appear in different parts of the Gemara. Rambam is consistent in saying they don’t exist. Ramban, and those with his approach, don’t necessarily say that. One example of this is found in the response of the Radvaz, printed at the end of the laws of men not dressing in women’s clothes (Yoreh Deah, 182). The Radvaz addresses the question of one who believes in shaydim and offers incense to them – not to deify them but to cause them to act in a way beneficial to the person.]
The Ramah in Yoreh Deah (179:1) cites the verse ‘Tamim tihiyeh im Hashem Elokecha’ (a verse from our parasha) to explain the prohibition of looking to these practices to seek the future. Whatever your approach to them – that they are nonsense or just against the natural order – our approach as the Jewish people must be to be tamim – to have courage. Our courage derives from belief in God and the impact of his Hand in the world. Those who seek these forms of divination do so out of fear or terror. We must not be afraid to face the world.-HG
